China is one of the world’s manufacturing powerhouses. It produces more than half the world’s steel, aluminum and cement, and is the world’s largest producer of plastics and ammonia. China generates around 30% of manufacturing value added globally, as compared with roughly 16–17% each from the United States and European Union. ¹

Manufacturing is the largest source of heat-trapping emissions in China. In 2019, roughly 35% of China’s heat-trapping emissions came from manufacturing. When indirect emissions from electricity generated for manufacturing are included, the figure is 60%. The steel and cement sectors are the largest sources. Chemicals, refineries and smelters of non-ferrous metals, such as aluminum, are also significant contributors. ²

China’s major climate policy statements over the past fifteen years have often included some treatment of the manufacturing sector’s carbon footprint. Mitigation work has historically centered on boosting energy efficiency and reining in overcapacity—priorities that align well with national industrial policies and energy security goals. These priorities remain central to China’s plans to achieve a manufacturing emissions peak and drive broader industrial upgrading to support “high-quality development”. Research, development and demonstration projects are focused on technological breakthroughs for deep decarbonization as a long-term priority.

Note on Terminology

The terms “manufacturing” and “industry” have overlapping definitions in Chinese policy. In official Chinese statistics, “manufacturing” refers to light and heavy industry, including large emissions sources such as cement, steel, non-ferrous metals smelting and chemicals, as well as many sectors with more modest greenhouse gas footprints such as textiles, papermaking and equipment manufacturing. ³ “Industry” is a broader term that includes manufacturing as well as coal mining, oil and gas extraction, and the production and supply of electric power. These two terms are used in this way in this chapter. (In many Chinese policy documents, the term “industry” refers mostly or exclusively to the manufacturing sector, even though the definition in official statistical documents is broader.)

Scope 1 emissions are the emissions a company or facility produces from assets directly under its control, through combustion of fossil fuels for process heat, for instance, or through industrial processes that generate greenhouse gases as a byproduct.

Scope 2 emissions are emissions a company or facility produces indirectly from the energy carriers it procures––for example, through its purchase of electricity or heat produced with fossil fuels.

A. Overview of China’s Manufacturing Sector

In 2021, the gross value added from China’s manufacturing sector was RMB 31.7 trillion (roughly $4.5 trillion), accounting for 27.4% of the nation’s GDP. ⁴ China led the world in manufacturing value added, with 29.8% of the global total. ⁵

Figure 11-1: Manufacturing Value-Added in 2020 ($, trillions)

Source: World Bank ⁶

The manufacturing sector accounts for the highest value added share of GDP among any major sectors in Chinese statistical accounting. The next largest are wholesale and retail trade (9.7%), finance (8.0%), construction (7.6%) and housing (6.8%).< ⁷ This sector has grown 7% on average over the past decade and yet its value added share of GDP has been declining steadily over the past decade, from 32.1% in 2011 to 27.4% today (Figure 11-2). ⁸

Figure 11-2: Chinese Manufacturing Value-Added as a Share of GDP 2004-2021

Source: World Bank ⁹

China is the world’s largest manufacturer of a number of important products. It accounts for 50–60% of global output of crude steel, primary aluminum, cement and methanol. ¹⁰ It is also the world’s largest producer of other products such as ammonia, plastics, refined copper and textiles, with around 30–40% shares in each. ¹¹ A number of these products involve carbon-intensive or energy-intensive production processes, as discussed further below.

B. Energy Use

Manufacturing is China’s largest energy consumer. In 2020, manufacturing sector activities were responsible for roughly 56% of total energy consumption in China. ¹² This share fell fairly steadily during the 2010s after peaking in 2007 at around 62%.

These trends track overall shifts in the structure of the Chinese economy (from manufacturing to services). They also reflect a significant decline in the energy intensity of Chinese manufacturing, which fell threefold between the mid-2000s and the mid-2010s (Figure 11-3).

Energy efficiency gains have been an important driver of these savings. The cement sector, for instance, boosted production volumes by 133% between 2005 and 2014 while increasing coal consumption by only 46%. Between 2000 and 2015, the energy intensity of Chinese steel production fell around 30%. ¹³ These gains are partly due to turnover in production facilities as inefficient small-scale units have been replaced by larger, more advanced facilities. As of 2020, for instance, the average ages of major energy-consuming assets in China’s steel, cement and chemicals sectors are around 7 to 15 years old, as against 40-year expected lifetimes. ¹⁴ But the increasing penetration of such efficient units has also meant less room for new gains, leading to a slower pace of improvements in recent years.

Figure 11-3: Energy Use in Chinese Manufacturing, 2004-19

Source: World Bank, National Bureau of Statistics. ¹⁵

Within manufacturing, several sectors stand out as particularly energy-intensive. Top of this list is the smelting and pressing of ferrous metals––iron, steel and other iron-based alloys, which accounted for around 13% of national energy consumption in 2019. Other top energy-intensive manufacturing activities include manufacturing of raw chemical materials and chemical products; manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products (e.g. cement, glass and limestone); processing of petroleum, coal and other fuels; and smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals (e.g. aluminum, copper and zinc) (Figure 11-4). ¹⁶ These five sectors combined comprise over 40% of Chinese energy consumption.

Figure 11-4: Energy-Intensive and Carbon-Intensive Industries in China (2019)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics; Guan et al. (2021); Shan et al. (2020); Shan et al. (2018). ¹⁷

C. Emissions of Heat-Trapping Gases

China’s manufacturing heat-trapping gas emissions are relatively varied in their sources and the forms they take. They include:

Scope 1 emissions of CO₂ from fuel combustion for heat (for instance, emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels to create heat for producing ammonia).
Scope 1 emissions of CO₂, nitrous oxide (N₂O) and fluorinated gases (F-gases). Some industrial processes – such as cement production – involve chemical or physical transformations that emit heat-trapping gases as byproducts.
Scope 2 emissions of CO₂ from electricity consumption (for instance, emissions from fossil fuel combustion to generate electricity that powers the grinding of raw materials in cement production).

The diversity of sources and types of manufacturing emissions make a comprehensive sectoral inventory challenging. Data from China’s most recent national greenhouse gas inventory, for 2014, indicated that Chinese Scope 1 emissions from energy usage in manufacturing and construction and from industrial processes were a combined 5.2 Gt CO₂e, just under half (46.6%) of total national emissions. Around 4.8 Gt CO₂e (42.5%) came from CO₂, with the balance split between N₂O and F-gases. ¹⁸

These estimates, notably, do not reflect the Chinese manufacturing sector’s Scope 2 emissions––and the manufacturing sector’s sizable share of national electricity consumption means that these are also important to consider. Tsinghua University’s Carbon Emissions Accounts and Datasets (CEADs) project includes sectoral emissions estimates covering the largest manufacturing sources––CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel and electricity consumption and from cement production processes. ¹⁹ Per their data, Scope 2 emissions have consistently accounted for around 40% of the manufacturing sector’s emissions footprint in recent years. They estimate around 6.0 Gt of combined Scope 1 and 2 CO₂ emissions from the manufacturing sector in 2019, comprising 61.6% of national emissions.

Around half of national emissions came from the same five sectors that dominate manufacturing energy use (Figure 11-4). More than a third came from sectors: non-metallic mineral products (largely cement) and smelting and pressing of ferrous metals (iron and steel). High emissions in these sectors reflect process emissions from cement production as well as the carbon intensity of China’s steel industry, which relies largely upon blast furnaces consuming large volumes of coking coal. ²⁰ (Carbon intensity is the carbon emissions per unit of output.)

Manufacturing emissions have grown substantially over the past three decades––a threefold increase since the late 1990s, per CEADs data. Yet that increase took place entirely between the early 2000s and the early 2010s (Figure 11-5). Between 2014 and 2017, manufacturing emissions declined around 5%. In 2018, manufacturing emissions started a modest rebound. These trends follow output patterns in major carbon-intensive industrial products such as cement and steel. Production of both items fell amidst slowing economic growth in the mid-2010s, but steel rebounded in the late 2010s amidst renewed infrastructure spending. ²¹

Figure 11-5: Chinese CO₂ Emissions from Major Industrial Sources (1997-2019)

Source: Guan et al. (2021); Shan et al. (2020); Shan et al. (2018) ²²

Manufacturing emissions’ share of national emissions likewise grew from the early 2000s but flattened out from the late 2000s and began declining around the early 2010s (Figure 11-6). This trend reflects energy efficiency gains as well as structural shifts in the Chinese economy towards consumption-driven sectors such as services and household use. ²³ Service-sector emissions (Scope 1 and Scope 2) in 2019 were just 16.3% of national emissions, a quarter of the manufacturing sector. But service-sector emissions growth has exceeded the manufacturing sector every year from 2010 to 2019, the most recent year in the CEADs inventory.

Figure 11-6: Chinese CO₂ Emissions from Major Industrial Sources as a Share of National Emissions (1997-2019)

Source: Guan et al. (2021); Shan et al. (2020); Shan et al. (2018) ²⁴

Economic policy in the COVID era has driven some of China’s largest emissions swings in the past decade. Analysis from the Center for Research on Clean Air and Energy finds year-on-year drops in quarterly national emissions up to 5% during early 2020 and 2022. Between these declines, however, was a surge in emissions, reaching as high as a 15% year-on-year increase in Q1 2021 emissions. These swings largely tracked industrial output. COVID lockdowns in early 2020 and 2022 curtailed manufacturing activity, while tightening policy in the real estate and steel sectors reduced cement and steel production. The 2021 spike, meanwhile, reflected a post-COVID infrastructure stimulus. ²⁵

China has been the world’s largest source of manufacturing emissions for several decades now. Estimates for 2019 by the World Resources Institute suggest that China accounts for 43% of global Scope 1 emissions from industrial processes and from energy usage in manufacturing and construction. Chinese emissions from these sources have exceeded any other country since at least 1990, when their estimates begin. But the gap between China and the rest of the world has grown enormously since then. Chinese emissions exceeded US emissions from these sources by around 10% in 1990; in 2019, they were around six times those of the US and 5.5 times those of India. ²⁶

D. Policy

China’s major policy statements around emissions of greenhouse gases over the past fifteen years have often included some treatment of the manufacturing sector’s carbon footprint. These plans have linked carbon emissions reduction to other policy priorities including energy efficiency, local air pollution and industrial upgrading, with a supporting role for low-carbon technology development and the control of emissions of non-CO₂ heat-trapping gases such as N₂O and F-gases. ²⁷ These priorities have been captured in a succession of targets for reducing the energy intensity and carbon intensity of industrial value added, issued often in more general plans for the sector. For instance, the Made in China 2025 plan, issued by the State Council in May 2015, targeted a 40% reduction in the carbon intensity of industrial value added by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. ²⁸

Policy documents released in 2021–22 outline China’s updated manufacturing emissions policy priorities since Xi Jinping’s pledge in 2020 to achieve an emissions peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. China’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), submitted in October 2021, included “a green and low-carbon transformation of the industrial sector” as one of the new measures to implement its 30–60 goals. At a high level, it called for the implementation of peaking plans in high-emitting sectors including iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals and chemicals, and building materials, as well as industrial restructuring targets “guided by the principle of energy conservation and carbon reduction.” More specific themes discussed included overcapacity control, expanded “clean and low-carbon energy” use, and adoption of circular economy and low-carbon technologies. ²⁹

The NDC, as an outward-facing commitment, reflects policy priorities developed through China’s domestic-facing policy apparatus. An important summary of these priorities, at least in the short term, is the Implementation Plan for Carbon Peaking in Industry, released in summer 2022 by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE). ³⁰ This plan, which covers the manufacturing sector, is one of a series of emissions peaking action plans already released or under development for different sectors and regions. ³¹ As with many Chinese policy plans, it covers a sprawling range of topics. Key priorities and targets include:

Priorities: the Plan indicates that energy efficiency and industrial upgrading remain the key focus areas for peaking, with technological innovation more important for post-peaking emissions reductions.
Priority areas for industrial upgrading include controlling capacity additions and eliminating inefficient excess capacity growth (“resolutely restricting the blind development of energy-intensive, emissions-intensive, low-quality projects”). These are long-standing priorities in heavy industry but have been challenging. Installed steel capacity as of 2019–20, for instance, exceeded policy targets by roughly 20% (200mt). ³²
Other action items include (i) promoting electrification, (ii) aligning industrial siting with the needs of low-carbon production, and (iii) advancing research, deployment and demonstration projects on low-carbon technologies. ³³

Targets:

Peaking emissions in the industrial sector by 2030.
Reducing the energy intensity of industrial value added by 13.5%, equal to the national goal for reducing energy intensity of GDP.
Securing a decline in carbon emissions intensity of industrial value beyond the national decline in emissions intensity, targeted at 18% for the same period. ³⁴

The Chinese government uses Five-Year Plans (FYPs) to indicate economic priorities at national, regional and sectoral levels. The current planning cycle (2021–25) features several plans relevant to industrial emissions.

The 14th Five-Year Plan Outline, covering 2021–25, is China’s most important economic policy document, presenting the country’s overall priorities and targets for the period. It is drafted by the State Council, China’s top administrative authority, under guidance from top leadership in the CCP Central Committee. ³⁵ It specifies broad priorities for the manufacturing sector, emphasizing industrial upgrading in service of the long-standing national goal of becoming a “strong manufacturing nation”. ³⁶ Measures towards this end include controlling inefficient excess production and strengthening energy efficiency and other environmental performance indicators in coal use. ³⁷ It also calls out hydrogen, a key input for industrial decarbonization, as one of seven “areas for cutting-edge technological and industrial transformations.” The other areas listed––including artificial intelligence and deep-sea and space exploration––underscore hydrogen’s standing in national innovation agendas. ³⁸

Sectoral or issue-specific FYPs provide targets and more detailed priorities for the manufacturing sector. The 14th Five-Year Plan for Raw Materials, released by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of Natural Resources, specifically covers iron and steel, building materials, petrochemicals and chemicals, and non-ferrous metals––the most carbon-intensive sectors in manufacturing. ³⁹ Another relevant plan is the MIIT’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Green Development in Industry. ⁴⁰ Both were released in late 2021.

Priorities: many of the relevant issues discussed in other plans reviewed above––industrial upgrading, overcapacity, energy efficiency, technology development––are discussed in greater detail in these plans.
On industrial clustering, for instance, the Raw Materials plan discusses “advancing” a range of specific aims: shifting aluminum facilities to locations with plentiful hydropower or wind resources, siting electric arc furnaces near cities to access scrap steel, and better integrating chemicals manufacturing with green hydrogen production. ⁴¹
On low-carbon manufacturing technology, the plans call out a wide range of technologies for R&D, pilot projects or further promotion. These include pre-commercial hydrogen applications in steel and cement and carbon capture and utilization in cement and chemicals, as well as mature technologies such as waste-derived fuel in cement kilns. ⁴²

Targets: major targets include:

Declines in energy intensity of 2% in cement and 3.7% in steel by 2025. (The plan reports a 4.7% decline in steel energy intensity among large and medium-sized firms in 2016–20.) ⁴³
A 5% decline in carbon emissions from electrolytic aluminum by 2025, the biggest energy-consuming sector within non-ferrous metals. ⁴⁴
An increase in recycled steel usage in iron supply from 260mt in 2020 to 320mt by 2025, as well as an increase in recycled metals in non-ferrous metals supply from 14.3mt to 20mt (Green Development plan); a 30% share for recycled steel supply in total steel output and a 35% share for recycled copper, up from 25% and 32.5% today (Raw Materials plan). ⁴⁵ (The absolute volume targets were initially announced by the NDRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan on Circular Economy Development in summer 2021. ⁴⁶)

The 14th FYP Outline supports industries “with the right conditions” to pursue emissions peaking earlier than the pre-2030 national target. ⁴⁷ As of mid-2022, official government plans for the high-emitting industrial sectors discussed in this paper did not include any such early-peaking targets, though no specific peaking plans have been released beyond the industry action plan cited above. ⁴⁸ That said, the absence of stricter targets does not preclude early peaking, especially in sectors such as cement and steel with slowing output growth. ⁴⁹ Indeed, some industrial associations tied to these sectors have suggested earlier targets. The building materials association in early 2021 announced a goal of sector-wide peaking by 2025 and cement peaking by 2023, while the association for the coking coal industry––a carbon-intensive input for the production of steel and other industrial products––has announced a 2025 peaking target. ⁵⁰ Companies have been generally more hesitant to issue targets, though the steel sector’s largest three state-owned enterprises, with capacity equal to 21% of 2022 production, have announced peaking targets for 2022–25. ⁵¹

Emissions control in these sectors can also benefit from other trends that reduce the carbon intensity of output. For instance:

Steel: capacity restriction policies in steel seek to incentivize installations of electric arc furnaces (EAFs) and other plant types that help reduce air pollution and carbon emissions footprints. Data from the Center for Research on Clean Air and Energy finds that the share of EAFs in capacity additions grew from 12.9% in 2019 to 38.9% in 2021. ⁵² The Guiding Opinions on the High-Quality Development of the Iron and Steel Industry, released in early 2022 by the MIIT, NDRC and MEE, targets by 2025 a 15%+ production share in crude steel for EAFs. (EAFs produced 10.6% of national output in 2021 ⁵³)
Aluminum: the Implementation Plan for Coordinating Increases in Efficiency to Reduce Pollution and Carbon Emissions, released by the MEE, NDRC, MIIT and four other ministries, targets a 30% share in 2025 for renewables in power usage by electrolytic aluminum smelters. These smelters account for 6% of national power consumption. The 2021 renewables share in their power mix was 22%, up from just 12% in 2018. These gains largely reflected the relocation of smelters in northern China with captive coal power plants to parts of southwest China with plentiful hydropower. ⁵⁴
- The NDRC has also introduced pricing surcharges for less efficient smelters. ⁵⁵ (China’s aluminum smelters are already more efficient than global averages, and even smelters with 4% higher efficiency above the world average will be penalized under this policy. ⁵⁶) These measures are part of a series of mechanisms in power pricing reforms since 2021 that expose coal-intensive industries to higher electricity prices. ⁵⁷

On the other hand, ministries have cautioned against overly aggressive application of carbon and energy efficiency targets. The NDRC, MIIT, MEE and two other agencies in October 2021 released Certain Opinions on Rigorously Enforcing Energy Efficiency Restrictions and Advancing Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction in Major Industries clarifying the import of the 30–60 goals for industrial energy efficiency work. This directive included a warning against economic and social disruptions from “one-size-fits-all” management and “campaign-style carbon reduction.” ⁵⁸

Carbon neutrality in manufacturing will require the introduction of technologies with limited deployment today, including hydrogen-based iron reduction in steel manufacturing, carbon capture in the cement industry, and CO₂ capture and utilization in methanol production. Chinese firms have announced or completed a range of demonstration projects in these areas. ⁵⁹ But policymakers have publicly recognized the challenges in reaching carbon neutrality in manufacturing. The 14th FYP on Raw Materials speaks frankly on “hard tasks of carbon peaking and neutrality” among factors that make “green and safe development increasingly urgent.” Its treatment of bottlenecks and weaknesses in these sectors cites deficits in technological and resource self-sufficiency (among other concerns) and notes that, “for green and low-carbon development, the task is heavy and the road is long.” ⁶⁰ Progress globally on this road requires progress in China.

Emissions Trading

References

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (Current $), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.CD, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022). For more information on comparability between World Bank and Chinese domestic statistics on the manufacturing sector, see footnote 5.

Emissions figures for the manufacturing sector in this chapter are calculated based upon sectoral emissions estimates from the China Emissions Datasets and Accounts Series (CEADs) project, available at CEADs; Yuru Guan et al., “Assessment to China’s Recent Emission Pattern Shifts,” Earth’s Future, 9, No. 11 (2021): e2021EF002241; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” Scientific Data 7, No. 1 (February 13, 2020): 54; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, No. 1 (January 16, 2018): 170201. For details on the sectors included under manufacturing, see the table of contents for General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine and Standardization Administration of China, “P.R.C. National Standard GB/T 4754-2017 国民经济行业分类 [Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities],” (in Chinese) (October 1, 2017).

For the full list of sectors under “manufacturing,” see footnote 2.

People’s Daily, “我国制造业增加值连续12年世界第一 (National Manufacturing Industry Value-Added Is the World’s Largest for 12 Years Running),” (in Chinese) (March 10, 2022).

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (Current $), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.CD, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022). The World Bank’s manufacturing statistics include all economic activity under categories 15–37 under the United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3. These categories generally match with the definition of “manufacturing” under Chinese industrial classifications, referenced in footnote 2.

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (Current $), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.CD, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022)

National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业增加值 “Value-Added by Sector” (under 年度数据 Annual Data / 国民经济核算 National Economic Accounts), (accessed August 14, 2022). (For manufacturing sector value added, see footnote 4.)

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (Current $), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.CD, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022); World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), World Development Indicators, indicator code NV.IND.MANF.ZS (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022).

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.ZS, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022)

World Cement Association, “World Wide Cement Production 2018 & Forecast 2030,” (accessed April 21, 2021); World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures 2022,” (accessed August 4, 2022); International Aluminium Institute, “Primary Aluminium Production,” (July 20, 2022); International Energy Agency, “An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China,” (September 2021), 104.

For copper, see United States Geological Survey, “Copper,” in Mineral Commodities Summaries, Scientific Investigations Report, 2021; International Copper Study Group, “The World Copper Factbook 2021,” 2021, 20, 25. For textiles, see Shwweta Punj and MG Arun, “Losing The Thread,” India Today (July 4, 2020); Astrid Pepermans, “China as a Textile Giant Preserving Its Leading Position in the World, and What It Means for the EU,” 政治科學論叢 (Collected Papers in Political Science), No. 80 (June 1, 2019): 76. For ammonia, see International Energy Agency, Ammonia Technology Roadmap: Towards More Sustainable Nitrogen Fertiliser Production (OECD, 2021), 24. For plastics, see Plastics Europe and European Association of Plastics Recycling and Recovery Organisations, Plastics – the Facts, 2021 (Brussels, Belgium, 2021), 13.

Calculated based upon National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业能源消费总量 “Total Energy Consumption by Sector” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 能源 Energy), (accessed August 14, 2022). For a list of sectors included under manufacturing, see footnote 2.

Laszlo Varro and An Fengquan, “China’s Net-Zero Ambitions: The Next Five-Year Plan Will Be Critical for an Accelerated Energy Transition,” International Energy Agency (October 29, 2020).

World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (Current $), indicator code NV.IND.MANF.CD, World Development Indicators (updated July 20, 2022) (accessed August 14, 2022); National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业能源消费总量 “Total Energy Consumption by Sector” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 能源 Energy), (accessed August 14, 2022)

National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业能源消费总量 “Total Energy Consumption by Sector” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 能源 Energy), (accessed August 14, 2022).

11-4: National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业能源消费总量 “Total Energy Consumption by Sector” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 能源 Energy), (accessed August 14, 2022); Yuru Guan et al., “Assessment to China’s Recent Emission Pattern Shifts,” Earth’s Future, 9, No. 11 (2021): e2021EF002241; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” Scientific Data 7, No. 1 (February 13, 2020): 54; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, No. 1 (January 16, 2018): 170201. Conversions of energy consumption volumes from tonnes of standard coal equivalent (tce), as used in Chinese data, to joules uses a conversion factor of 29.31 GJ/tce. National Research Council, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Engineering, Cooperation in the Energy Futures of China and the United States, National Academies Press (2000), 92.

This figure is calculated based on data in The People’s Republic of China, The People’s Republic of China Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change (December 2018), 16–20. It uses as its baseline the reported total of 11,186mt CO₂e (including emissions from land use changes). It adds reported CO₂e figures for all GHGs from industrial processes to CO₂e figures from energy usage in manufacturing and construction that are calculated by applying the inventory’s global warming potential factors to reported CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O emissions volumes. Note that all F-gas emissions in this inventory are attributed to industrial processes, although some of these emissions often occur in the use of these products (as in leaks of F-gases used in air conditioning and refrigeration equipment). Industrial Processes and Product Use in 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, vol. 3, sec. 1.1 (accessed August 14, 2022).

Guan et al., “Assessment to China’s Recent Emission Pattern Shifts,” (October 21, 2021); Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5 (January 16, 2018); Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” Scientific Data 7 (February 13, 2020). Data is available at CEADs. Note that the CEADs inventory for 2014 appears to trail the 2014 national GHG inventory by around 10%. The national inventory records 4.39 Gt of Scope 1 CO₂ emissions from energy use in manufacturing and construction as well as industrial processes in the “minerals” sector (i.e., cement production). The CEADs inventory records 3.95 Gt. (For national inventory data and calculation methods, see footnote 14.)

Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China's Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center of Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021) 11–12; Ali Hasanbeigi and Cecilia Springer, “How Clean Is the U.S. Steel Industry?,” Global Efficiency Intelligence (November 2019), 20.

Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China's Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center of Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021) 38–39. The trends in CEADs data in 2014–19 align with those from the Climate Watch (CAIT) dataset, which records China’s Scope 1 emissions from energy use in manufacturing and construction and industrial processes. CAIT records a 2014 peak in CO₂ emissions in these sectors at 3.86 Gt, with a decline through 2017 and a modest rebound in 2018–19 to 3.60 Gt. World Resources Institute, Historical GHG Emissions, Climate Analysis Indicators data set, Climate Watch platform (2021).

Yuru Guan et al., “Assessment to China’s Recent Emission Pattern Shifts,” Earth’s Future, 9, No. 11 (2021): e2021EF002241; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 2016–2017,” Scientific Data 7, No. 1 (February 13, 2020): 54; Yuli Shan et al., “China CO₂ Emission Accounts 1997–2015,” Scientific Data 5, No. 1 (January 16, 2018): 170201.

International Energy Agency, “E4 Country Profile: Energy Efficiency in China,” IEA (February 12, 2021).

Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: Surge in China’s Steel Production Helps to Fuel Record-High CO2 Emissions,” CarbonBrief (December 3, 2020); Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: China’s Post-Lockdown Emissions Surge Shows Signs of Cooling,” CarbonBrief (August 13, 2021); Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: China’s CO2 Emissions See First Quarterly Fall since Post-Lockdown Surge,” CarbonBrief (November 25, 2021); Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: China’s CO2 Emissions See Longest Sustained Drop in a Decade,” CarbonBrief (May 30, 2022).

World Resources Institute, Historical GHG Emissions, Climate Analysis Indicators data set, Climate Watch platform (2021).

See e.g., Ministry of Ecology and Environment, “China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2019),” (November 2019), 3,8; The People’s Republic of China, “Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’ S Intended Nationally Determined Contributions,” (in Chinese) (September 3, 2016), 8–9; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology et al., “工业领域应对气候变化行动方案（2012年-2020年）[Action Plan for Confronting Climate Change in Industry (2012-20)],” (in Chinese) (December 31, 2012); National Development and Reform Commission, “国家应对气候变化规划（2014-2020 年）[National Plan for Confronting Climate Change (2012-2020)],” (in Chinese) (September 2014). See also Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China's Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021) 19–24.

State Council, “国务院关于印发《中国制造2025》的通知 [Notification from the State Council on the Publication of “Made in China 2025"],” (in Chinese) (May 8, 2015).

The People’s Republic of China, “China’s Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions,” (June 2022), 35.

Fan Danting and Dimitri De Boer, “How Is Progress in China’s 1+N Policy Framework?,” China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (March 11, 2022).

Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021), 40; Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: Surge in China’s Steel Production Helps to Fuel Record-High CO2 Emissions,” CarbonBrief (December 3, 2020). On overcapacity in other sectors, see International Energy Agency, “An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China,” (September 2021) 103; Bruce Wang, Jie Gong and Haipeng Li, “Can Cement Industry ‘Coopetition’ Ensure Long-Term Stability?,” Hong Kong: Huatai Research (August 15, 2019), 25–28.

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Ecology and Environment, “三部委关于印发工业领域碳达峰实施方案的通知 (Notification from Three Ministries Regarding Publication of Implementation Plan for Carbon Peaking in Industry),” 3. National targets are taken from People’s Republic of China, “Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Term 2035 Goals for the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要) (March 12, 2021) (accessed May 11, 2021), 10.

Xinhua, “China Focus: China’s Five-Year Plan: A Democratic Perspective,” (March 11, 2021).

The “strong manufacturing nation” played a prominent role in the Made in China 2025 plan for industrial upgrading released in May 2015, though it was in use before then. State Council, “国务院关于印发《中国制造2025》的通知 [Notification from the State Council on the Publication of “Made in China 2025"]”; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “制造强国战略揭开新篇章 [Revealing a New Chapter in the Strategy for a Strong Manufacturing Nation],” (in Chinese) (February 3, 2015).

People’s Republic of China, “Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Term 2035 Goals for the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China,” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要) (in Chinese) (March 12, 2021) (accessed May 11, 2021) 95.

People’s Republic of China, “Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Term 2035 Goals for the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要) (in Chinese) (March 12, 2021) (accessed May 11, 2021) 24.

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “工业和信息化部关于印发《‘十四五’工业绿色发展规划》的通知 [Notification from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on the Publication of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Green Development in Industry],” (in Chinese) (November 15, 2021).

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Natural Resources, “"十四五”原材料工业发展规划 (14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Raw Materials Industry),” 16–17; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “工业和信息化部关于印发《‘十四五’工业绿色发展规划》的通知 [Notification from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on the Publication of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Green Development in Industry],” 5–6.

Targets are taken from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Natural Resources, “"十四五”原材料工业发展规划 (14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Raw Materials Industry),” 22–23; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “工业和信息化部关于印发《‘十四五’工业绿色发展规划》的通知 [Notification from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on the Publication of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Green Development in Industry],” 12. The Raw Materials plan also targets a 20% share of recycled aluminum, but China has already achieved this share as of 2020. Baseline absolute volumes are calculated based upon 2020 crude steel (粗钢), refined copper (精炼铜), and primary aluminum (原铝（电解铝）) output from the National Bureau of Statistics. National Bureau of Statistics, indicator工业产品总量 “Industrial Product Output” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 工业 Industry), (accessed August 24, 2022). Baseline shares are taken from the NDRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Circular Economy Development. National Development and Reform Commission, “关于印发‘十四五’循环经济发展规划的通知 [Notification Regarding the Publication of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Circular Economy Development],” (in Chinese) (July 1, 2021) 1–2.

National Development and Reform Commission, “关于印发‘十四五’循环经济发展规划的通知 [Notification Regarding the Publication of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Circular Economy Development],” 4–5.

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Natural Resources, “"十四五”原材料工业发展规划 (14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Raw Materials Industry),” 16; People’s Republic of China, “Outline of 14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Term 2035 Goals for the Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要) (in Chinese) (March 12, 2021) (accessed May 11, 2021) 93.

For steel, media reports suggest that a draft Action Plan for Peaking and Reducing Emissions in the Iron and Steel Industry had been prepared as of April 2021, with targets of peaking by 2025 and reducing emissions 30% from peak levels by 2030. A final plan had not been released as of August 2022, and its status is unclear from public documents. A high-level document on overall development in steel, the Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the High-Quality Development of the Iron and Steel Sector, spoke of ensuring that the sector peaked emissions by 2030. But China Coking Coal Industry’s Action Plan for the Coking Coal Industry on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality explicitly cites the steel industry’s action plan as targeting a 2025 peak. Liang Qian (粱倩), “钢铁行业碳达峰及降碳行动方案成型 [Steel Industry Carbon Emissions Peaking and Reduction Action Plan Takes Shape],” Economic Information Daily (经济参考报) (in Chinese) (March 30, 2021) (accessed August 14, 2022); Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Ecology and Environment, “三部委关于促进钢铁工业高质量发展的指导意见 (Guiding Opinions from Three Ministries on Accelerating the High-Quality Development of the Iron and Steel Industry),” (in Chinese) (January 20, 2022); China Coking Coal Industry Association, “焦化行业碳达峰碳中和行动方案 [Action Plan for the Coking Coal Industry on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality],” (in Chinese) (August 3, 2022) 5.

“China Cement Association Vice Chair Li Shen told reporters in January 2021 that ‘clinker production volume is the biggest factor influencing the cement industry’s carbon emissions’ and projected that the production peak expected during the 14^th FYP would secure an emissions peak.” Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021), 38–40.

China Building Materials Federation, “推进建筑材料行业碳达峰、碳中和行动倡议书 [Action Declaration for Advancing Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Building Materials],” (in Chinese) (accessed August 13, 2022); China Coking Coal Industry Association, “焦化行业碳达峰碳中和行动方案 [Action Plan for the Coking Coal Industry on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality],” 5.

For cement and steel company targets, see Edmund Downie, “Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges,” Columbia University SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy (August 25, 2021) 27–28. The three largest SOEs by production as of 2021 were Baowu (119.95mt), Ansteel (55.65mt) and HBIS (41.64mt); total Chinese production was 1032.8mt. See World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures 2022,” 7.

Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “Most Coal Power Plants since 2016 Entered Construction in China in 2021, Investment in Coal-Based Steelmaking Accelerated,” (February 2022), 11.

World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures 2022,” 10.

Electrolytic aluminum’s share of 2020 power consumption is estimated based upon national power consumption by Chinese primary aluminum smelters reported by the International Aluminum Institute (520TWh) as against China’s 2020 national power consumption of around 7500TWh; National Bureau of Statistics, indicator 分行业能源消费总量 “Total Energy Consumption by Sector” (under 年度数据Annual Data / 能源 Energy), (accessed August 14, 2022). For plant relocations, see e.g. “China Hongqiao to Move Aluminium Smelting Capacity to Yunnan Province,” Reuters, (December 28, 2021), Zheng Xin and Li Yingqing, “Weiqiao’s Relocated Aluminum Smelter Starts Operations in Yunnan Province,” China Daily (accessed August 24, 2022).

National Development and Reform Commission, “国家发展改革委关于完善电解铝行业阶梯电价政策的通知 [NDRC Notification on Improving Tiered Pricing Policies in the Electrolytic Aluminum Industry],” (in Chinese) (August 26, 2021).

China’s policy applies surcharges for units with efficiency of 13,650kWh/t or higher. The world average efficiency for aluminum smelters in 2021 was 14,114kWh/t. National Development and Reform Commission, “国家发展改革委关于完善电解铝行业阶梯电价政策的通知 [NDRC Notification on Improving Tiered Pricing Policies in the Electrolytic Aluminum Industry]”; International Aluminium Institute, “Primary Aluminium Smelting Energy Intensity,” (August 9, 2022).

National Development and Reform Commission, “关于进一步深化燃煤发电上网电价市场化改革的通知(发改价格〔2021〕1439号) [Notification on Further Deepening Marketization Reforms in On-Grid Pricing on Coal Power (NDRC Pricing No. 1439 (2021)],” (in Chinese) (October 11, 2021).

National Development and Reform Commission et al., “关于严格能效约束推动重点领域节能降碳的若干意见(发改产业〔2021〕1464号) [Certain Opinions on Rigorously Enforcing Energy Efficiency Restrictions and Advancing Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction in Major Industries (NDRC Industry 2021, No. 1464)],” (in Chinese) (October 18, 2021).

International Energy Agency, “An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China,” (September 2021) 105–6.