Ministry of Commerce, “对外直接投资统计制度》相关问题（50）[Questions Related to ‘System for Outbound Direct Investment Statistics’ (50)],” (in Chinese) (May 2020), question 11; Ministry of Commerce, “对外承包工程统计 [Statistics on Outbound Contracting Projects],” (in Chinese) (April 2022); Ministry of Commerce, “非金融类对外直接投资统计 [Statistics on Non-Financial Foreign Direct Investment],” (in Chinese) (April 2022); MOFCOM reports statistics on investment and contracting in BRI countries since 2014, but covers only 55–60 countries in BRI’s initial Eurasian core. See e.g. “商务部, “2021年我对‘一带一路’沿线国家投资合作情况,” (in Chinese) (January 24, 2022); 商务部, “2016年对‘一带一路’沿线国家投资合作情况,” (in Chinese) (January 19, 2017).
Derek Scissors, China Global Investment Tracker (American Enterprise Institute / Heritage Foundation), (accessed June 15, 2022). A report out of the Central University of Finance and Economics’ International Institute for Green Finance, combining CGIT data with other sources, finds similar trends: a 54% drop in investments into BRI countries, but a 70% drop in investments into non-BRI countries; Christoph Nedopil, China’s Investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2020 (Beijing: Central University of Finance and Economics International Institute for Green Finance, 2021), 5.
Derek Scissors, "China Global Investment Tracker".
Derek Scissors, China’s Overseas Investment Starts the Long Climb Back, American Enterprise Institute (July 2021), 8.
Lihuan Zhou et al., China Overseas Finance Inventory Database (World Resources Institute) (accessed June 29, 2022); Oyintarelado (Tarela) Moses, “The Evolving Landscape of Chinese-Financed Power Plants: Updates to the China Overseas Finance Inventory Database,” (July 6, 2022).
AidData, AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0 (September 2021); Ammar A. Malik et al., "Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects" (AidData, September 2021). AidData treats development finance as “the full range of projects that align with the OECD’s definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF). Therefore, any project that benefits from financial or in-kind support from any official sector [government and state-owned] institution in China is included, regardless of its purpose, level of financial concessionality, funding source and overseas destination.” AidData, “AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0,” sec. 1.1.
Gallagher, Kevin P., Zhongshu Li, Xu Chen and Xinyue Ma. China’s Global Power Database Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 2019.
Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Chinese Loans to Africa Database (accessed June 29, 2022).
Jyhjong Hwang et al., Chinese Loans to Africa During the COVID-19 Pandemic Boston University Global Development Policy Center (April 2022), 1,10.
Rebecca Ray et al., “Geolocated Dataset of Chinese Overseas Development Finance, Scientific Data 8, no. 1 (September 20, 2021): 241. The online version is available at https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/(accessed July 29, 2022). This dataset only treats finance from these two banks as development finance. This is a narrower definition than that used by AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Database, which includes other entities such as central and local government agencies and state-owned commercial banks.
Belt and Road Portal, “项目周报 [Weekly Project Reports],” (in Chinese) (accessed June 30, 2022).
Derek Scissors, China Global Investment Tracker.
More than half (150 GW) were coal projects involving Chinese contractors, though planned projects in this dataset may be affected by Xi’s “no new coal” pledge. Han Chen and Cecilia Springer, “China’s Uneven Regional Energy Investments,” Géopolitique, Réseau, Énergie, Environnement, Nature, no. 1 (September 2021): 98–107.
Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, BRIEFING: 12.8 GW of Chinese Overseas Coal Projects Cancelled, but 19 GW Could Still Go Ahead(April 2022), 1. Research from Boston University suggests a similar share for projects operational or under development between 2013 and mid-2019 (13%). Xinyue Ma and Kevin P Gallagher, Who Funds Overseas Coal Plants? Boston University Global Development Policy Center (July 2021).
These figures are minimums, as capacity information for 20 of the 430 projects is not available. Lihuan Zhou et al., China Overseas Finance Inventory Database: Technical Note (World Resources Institute, 2022), 17–18. The Global Coal Project Finance Tracker database, developed by Global Energy Monitor, identifies 60.9 GW of overseas coal financed since 2010 by Chinese entities. Global Coal Project Finance Tracker Global Energy Monitor (accessed June 30, 2022).
Yiheng Tao, Haiming Liang and Michael A. Celia, “Electric Power Development Associated with the Belt and Road Initiative and Its Carbon Emissions Implications,” Applied Energy 267 (June 1, 2020): 114784.
Mathias Lund Larsen and Lars Oehler, “Clean at Home, Polluting Abroad: The Role of the Chinese Financial System’s Differential Treatment of State-Owned and Private Enterprises,” Climate Policy (March 3, 2022).
Chen and Springer, “China’s Uneven Regional Energy Investments.”
Ma and Gallagher, “Who Funds Overseas Coal Plants?” Comparisons of Chinese, US and Japanese development finance institutions and FDI flows in the power sector indicate that, while more coal financing from these sources comes from China, the US and (especially) Japan support much more gas generation. See Xu Chen et al., “Financing Carbon Lock-in in Developing Countries: Bilateral Financing for Power Generation Technologies from China, Japan, and the United States,” Applied Energy 300 (October 15, 2021): 117318; Xu Chen, Kevin P. Gallagher and Denise L. Mauzerall, “Chinese Overseas Development Financing of Electric Power Generation: A Comparative Analysis,” One Earth 3, no. 4 (October 23, 2020): 491–503; Zhongshu Li, Kevin P. Gallagher and Denise L. Mauzerall, “China’s Global Power: Estimating Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the Electric Power Sector,” Energy Policy 136 (January 1, 2020): 111056.
Carolina Millan, "Billionaire-Owned Driller Buys Sinopec Assets in Argentina" Bloomberg, (June 30, 2021); Charles Newbery, “CGC Buys Sinopec Assets in Argentina to Increase Its Oil Output,” S&P Global Market Intelligence (June 30, 2021).
Christoph Nedopil Wang, China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2021 (Shanghai: Fanhai International School of Finance Green Finance & Development Center, 2022), 13–14.
Christoph Nedopil Wang, Brief: Coal Phase-out in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): An Analysis of Chinese-Backed Coal Power from 2014–2020 Beijing: Green Belt and Road Initiative Center, International Institute of Green Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics (June 16, 2021).
Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “BRIEFING: 12.8 GW of Chinese Overseas Coal Projects Cancelled, but 19 GW Could Still Go Ahead,” 1. A more recent report from researchers at the Sunrise Project and Inclusive Development International notes another potential loophole for projects with high political priority: “in February 2022, it was reported that China and Pakistan had agreed to prioritise the 300-megawatt Gwadar coal power plant,” a politically important project that had not yet reached financial closure. Danqing Li, Siman Li, and Mark Bo, “China’s Overseas Energy Investments after the ‘No Coal’ Pledge: An Assessment,” Global China Pulse (July 9, 2022), 68. A November 2021 report by Springer and Ma after Xi’s pledge identified 50.3 GW of coal-fired capacity under construction or another 50.8 GW under planning that involved either financing or construction arrangements from Chinese entities, representing 594 Mt of emissions. Cecilia Han Springer and Xinyue Ma, Potential Implications of Xi Jinping’s Green Energy and No-Overseas-Coal Announcement Boston University Global Development Policy Center (November 2021).
Masuma Farooki, China’s Mineral Sector and the Belt & Road Initiative Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials for Europe, 2018, 4. For more on key raw materials inputs for the global energy transition, see Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation, 2019, 59–60.
Magnus Ericsson, Olof Löf and Anton Löf, “Chinese Control over African and Global Mining—Past, Present and Future,” Mineral Economics 33, no. 1 (July 1, 2020): 174.
S&P Global Market Intelligence, China Outbound Mining Investment (2021).
Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, “China Controls Sway of Electric Vehicle Power through Battery Chemicals, Cathode and Anode Production,” (May 6, 2020); Kip Keen and Camille Erickson, “China Mining, Battery Companies Sweep up Lithium Supplies in Acquisition Blitz,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, (November 1, 2021).
Beatrice Tanjangco et al., Pulse 3: Recover, Reform, Restructure: China’s Outward Investment Appetite and Implications for Developing Countries London: Overseas Development Institute (June 2021), 52; Li Xuanmin and Xie Jun, “China, Myanmar Resume Rare-Earth Trade after Border Reopening, to Ease Prices Shortly,”Global Times (December 2, 2021).
Ericsson, Löf and Löf, “Chinese Control over African and Global Mining—Past, Present and Future,” 175.
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, “公开征求对《关于推动钢铁工业高质量发展的指导意见（征求意见稿）》的意见 [Public Solicitation of Opinions on ’Guiding Opinions Regarding the Advancement of the High-Quality Development of the Iron and Steel Industry (Draft for Public Consultation)’],” (December 31, 2020), 4.
Sheridan Prasso, “China’s Quest for Iron Threatens West African Ecosystem,” Bloomberg (June 23, 2022); Praveen Menon and Helen Reid, “Rio Tinto Signs Rail, Port JV with China-Backed Consortium for Guinea’s Simandou,” Reuters (July 28, 2022).
Ougna Camara, “China-Backed Group Can Resume Simandou Operations: Guinea,” Bloomberg (March 27, 2022); Menon and Reid, “Rio Tinto Signs Rail, Port JV with China-Backed Consortium for Guinea’s Simandou,” Reuters (July 28, 2022).
Eric Lipton and Dionne Searcey, “Chinese Company Removed as Operator of Cobalt Mine in Congo,” The New York Times, March 1, 2022.
Luis Scungio, “China’s Global Mineral Rush: Learning from Experiences around Controversial Chinese Mining Investments,” Amsterdam: Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (June 2021), 6.
See e.g. Lila Buckley et al., What Drives Safeguarding for China’s Hydropower Projects in LDCs? (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, January 2022), chap. 4. These issues are not necessarily unique to Chinese companies in this sector, as Buckley’s chapter illustrates.